A. Background of the Case
In this case, the Constitutional Court held that the provisions of the Criminal Act that provide the lower limit of the period of detention in a workhouse when sentencing a monetary penalty of not less than 100 million won (hereinafter referred to as the "Provisions on Detention in a Workhouse") are not in violation of the Constitution, but the provision of the Addenda to the Criminal Act under which the Provisions on Detention in a Workhouse should apply from the first case of prosecution filed on and after the enforcement date thereof (hereinafter referred to as the "Addenda Provision") violates the Constitution.
The petitioners, who were prosecuted "after the enforcement of the Provisions on Detention in a Workhouse" against an offense committed "before the enforcement of the Provisions on Detention in a Workhouse" filed a constitutional complaint against the Provisions on Detention in a Workhouse after the conviction became final and conclusive.
B. Summary of the Decision
The Constitutional Court held that the Provisions on Detention in a Workhouse is not in violation of the Constitution, but the Addenda Provision violates the Constitution, for the following reasons.
The Provisions on Detention in a Workhouse are intended to promote the fairness and equity of the workhouse detention system. If the period of detention is set too short, there would be persons who serve for the purpose of avoiding large fines even though their own financial capacity is sufficient, and therefore, it is necessary to set a minimum period of detention to compel the payment of fines, and by prescribing the lower limit of detention period in the Act, it would also be possible to minimize the imbalance that arises from the difference in the amount per day deductible by prison labor among prisoners. The Provisions on Detention in a Workhouse promotes equity in accordance with the severity and nature of crimes by increasing the lower limit of the detention period according to the amount of the fine, and the lower limit thereof cannot be considered to be an excessively long period taking into consideration that the upper limit of detention period is three years, and the amount of the fine sentenced. Therefore, the Provisions on Detention in a Workhouse cannot be construed as infringing on the petitioners’ physical freedom against the rule against excessive restriction.
On the other hand, considering that the term "punishment" in the principle of prohibition of retroactive punishment includes cases where physical freedom is deprived of, or similar cases where the details or actual effect of the sanctions on the relevant offense is strong in punitive nature, similar to imprisonment, detention in a workhouse is subject to the application of the principle of prohibition of retroactive punishment, because it deprives physical freedom in its substance and has a punitive nature similar to imprisonment. As the Provisions on Detention in a Workhouse were amended to set the lower limit of the detention period of a person sentenced to a fine of at least 100 million won to a stricter degree, an offense committed before these provisions enter into force should be subject to the Act existing as at the time the offense was committed. However, the Addenda Provision stipulates that an offense committed before the Provisions on Detention in a Workhouse enter into force should also be subject to application if the prosecution is filed after the Provisions on Detention in a Workhouse enter into force, and therefore, the relevant Addenda Provision is against the constitutional principle of prohibition of retroactive punishment.
Regarding the Addenda Provision, Justices Kang Il-Won and Cho Yong-Ho set forth the following concurring opinions.
As detention in a workhouse is the means that replaces payment of a fine and enforce monetary penalty by compelling payment, it is difficult to presume that the issue of retroactive punishment would occur even if a detention period is actually increased by prescribing the lower limit of period of detention in a workhouse. Provided, that, since the Addenda Provision is retroactive legislation that requires the application of the amended provision against an offense already terminated, it is not constitutionally permissible, except in extraordinary circumstances considering the principle of constitutional state that guarantees the protection of individual's confidence and legal stability. However, when the petitioners committed offenses, there was a belief that they would be sentenced to detention in workhouses for a shorter period than the one specified in the Provisions on Detention in a Workhouse, and therefore, imposing heavier responsibility through an ex post facto legislation for reasons of more strongly compelling the payment of large fines and promoting equity in the amount convertible by prison labor, without any prior warning for the stronger sanction, increases distrust in the entire legal system and contributes little to the public interest. Therefore, the Addenda Provision is against the constitutional principle of prohibition of retroactive legislation.
C. Significance of the Decision
The decision of constitutionality for the Provisions on Detention in a Workhouse, which were introduced to prevent so-called “emperor's labor,” was generally evaluated positively. The unconstitutionality decision for the Addenda Provision, which stipulates that any act committed before this provision is newly inserted is also subject to its application, was also positively viewed in that it kept faithful to the constitutional principle of prohibition of retroactive punishment.